

**Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism through the  
Creation of a New Forum for Collecting and Sharing  
Nuclear Material Security Best Practices: The Case for  
the World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)**

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# About the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

- NTI was founded in 1991 by former US Senator Sam Nunn and Ted Turner.
- NTI's mission is to strengthen global security by reducing the risk of use and preventing the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.
- NTI seeks to:
  - raise public awareness;
  - serve as a catalyst for new thinking; and
  - take direct action to reduce threats.

## Motivation for “Best Practices” Project

- One of the greatest security challenges of the 21st century is preventing the spread and use of nuclear weapons.
- Supplies of highly enriched uranium and plutonium are widely dispersed around the world.
- Terrorists won't necessarily look where there is the most material; they may go to the place where the material is the most vulnerable or accessible.
- Vulnerable nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere. Like most global problems, the defense against nuclear terrorism is dependent upon cooperative and collective global action.

# Existing Nuclear Security Architecture

- The concern of the international community has been translated since 9/11 into several new international instruments to help strengthen our global capacity to keep nuclear materials and weapons out of the hands of terrorists.
- Key among these initiatives are:
  - UN Security Council Resolution 1540;
  - the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials;
  - the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; and
  - the creation of the Nuclear Security Fund at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

## Role of a Global “Best Practices” Organization

- A global best practices organization could be the mechanism for raising the level of global best practices of nuclear materials security in a time urgent way.
- It could serve as a tool for industry and operators who want to stay ahead of the threat.
- Such an organization could provide a forum for the exchange of experience, lessons learned, and new ideas at the “grass roots” facility-operations level: a forum for practitioners rather than policy makers.

# The World Institute for Nuclear Security (WINS)

- WINS could conduct and facilitate a range of activities, in which entities can choose to participate voluntarily and on a case-by-case basis.
- An initial activity of WINS should be to collect “best practices” for nuclear material security.
- WINS will serve as a forum for operators and practitioners to share security strategies that go beyond internationally accepted standards to improve material security.
- These approaches would contribute to efforts to help facilities implement obligations under UN Security Council resolution 1540 and IAEA INFCIRC/225 Rev. 4.

# WINS, cont.

- Activities that would complement and supplement the IAEA's Nuclear Security Plan and assist the IAEA in realizing its nuclear security goals should be a major focus of WINS.
- It will be vital for WINS, in particular in the start-up phase, to work closely with the IAEA to avoid duplication of effort and therefore wasting of resources.
- WINS has an important role to play in raising the international awareness of the need for increased attention to nuclear materials security.
- WINS can also contribute to establishing and building the resource base of experts and services for nuclear material security. These kinds of activities can benefit all groups and individuals working in the field.

# Scope of Materials to be Addressed

- Defining the materials to be addressed by WINS activities will impact organizational priorities and shape activities and participation in the organization.
- We recommend that the decision on which materials to address should be based on a risk-based assessment that returns to the core rationale for establishing the organization.
- Under these terms, for example, WINS could define its initial goal as ensuring security of unirradiated direct use materials.
  - Highly enriched uranium (HEU),
  - Separated plutonium, and
  - Fresh MOX.
- Nothing in the definition of this scope should be interpreted as limiting the range of membership and future activities of the organization.



# Potential Participants

- Private Industry
- Government Agencies and Government Entities
- International Organizations
- Non-Government Organizations
- Professional Associations
- Universities

# Costs and Financing

- Start-up funding could be acquired through voluntary donations from industry, related government entities, NGOs, individuals, associations, professional organizations, and international organizations.
- WINS will generate sustained funding if it proves to contribute to the interests and values of the nuclear community.
- In order for the entity to remain viable over time, we believe it will be important to create a sustainable funding stream.
- Contributions could be made through in-kind donations, up front commitments, sustaining commitments, and ad-hoc donations.

# Challenges

- Sensitivities about the sharing of security information
- Emphasizing that participation in WINS will not mean the acceptance of new obligations on the part of facilities or organizations.
- Economic rationale
- Sense of urgency

# Next Steps

- NTI, in partnership with INMM and the IAEA, is working to carry out “pilot projects” to demonstrate the value of WINS-type activities to nuclear material managers and facility operators.
- These activities will be developed through consultation with a number of international partners, including the facility operator communities.
- We hope to define and carry out a demonstration project in two areas in 2007: plutonium security and highly enriched uranium.