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# Cold Neutron Source (CNS) Helium Injection Logic Modification

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
# OPAL Research Reactor

- 20MW Open Pool Australian Light water reactor
- Replaced the 10MW HIFAR research reactor (1958 – 2007)
- Reached criticality in August 2006
- Low enriched fuel used (19.75% U)
- Safe and productive operation for 10 years






# OPAL features




- Open Pool 20MW design
- Compact core - 16 fuel assemblies in 13 m deep pool
- Plate type Low Enriched uranium/silicide fuel
- No in-core irradiations
- D<sub>2</sub>O zircaloy reflector
- 2 independent & diverse shutdown systems
- Demineralised light water provides cooling and shielding (~ 300 kW/L upwards forced light water cooling of core).
- Heavy water surrounds the core in an enclosed reflector vessel
- 300 days of operation in 2016



# OPAL Reactor and its CNS




# OPAL CNS Structure




Vacuum containment vessel designed to withstand in-pile rupture / over-pressurisation event and protect reflector vessel



# OPAL CNS Statistics




- 20L of sub-cooled (full) liquid deuterium at average 25K
- Vertical thermosiphon in heavy water reflector
- Located 50cm centre-to-centre from reactor core
- 5kW heat load – cooled by 500 kW helium refrigeration cycle (2 x 250 kW compressors)
- Two tangential beams followed by 5 neutron guides serving 8 instruments
- Early outages due to process system faults, but near perfect reliability since 2013.




Small gap between guide and vacuum containment filled with light water

# CNS – Refrigeration Cryogenic (Helium) System




# CNS – Moderator (Deuterium) System

Liquid D<sub>2</sub> Circuit



Fills with Liquid Deuterium when refrigerant helium is cryogenic temp (< 31K)







# CNS – Vacuum System

CNS In-pile Assembly

Vacuum Containment



Helium can be injected into the vacuum containment through here


DIFFERENT HELIUM SYSTEM TO THE CRYOGENIC REFRIGERATION HELIUM!

# Helium Injection – What is it?



- The most important process condition is RCS helium flow – removes heat from in-pile.
- If helium flow stops, automatic REACTOR TRIP.
- CNS TRIP → decay heat from reactor imparted onto CNS - “HOT DAMAGE”
- Original design → INJECT helium into vacuum containment (if deuterium not liquid) to remove heat to prevent in-pile from overheating, into heat sink (reflector vessel)
- Did not take into account thermal stresses on the CNS in-pile structure “COLD DAMAGE”

# Helium Injection in the Spotlight




1. Vulnerable if CNS trips when it warms up or cools down. Deuterium could be vapour inside in-pile, but still cryogenic (e.g. 50 K)
2. REAL LIFE EVENT:
  - a) Helium flow ceased FIRST, deuterium naturally vapourised
  - b) Logic was RESET
  - c) HELIUM INJECTION PROCEEDED!

No evidence, calculation or modelling to know when it is safe to inject after a trip.




# Consequences of Helium Injection when Cold




- Large thermal stress due to the large temperature difference between the in-pile structure and injected helium.
- Possible damage to in-pile structure
- Possible heavy ice formation between the support tube and vacuum containment vessel – detrimental?
- Quenched thrice in LN post-manufacture – but AlMg5 properties unknown after 10 years of neutron bombardment

Although no subsequent damage was observed, ANSTO felt this risk was not acceptable to operate with.

**Administrative control (Override turned on indefinitely)**




# The Story so Far




# Modelling the In-Pile

- ANSTO modelled adiabatic temperature rise and distribution in the event of reactor Trip + decay heat (no helium injection).




Moderator chamber  $\Delta T$ :

- Temperature rise modelling moderator chamber only
- Temperature rise including connecting aluminium pipework
- Temperature rise including connecting Al + SS pipework






# Modelling the In-Pile




Moderator chamber  $\Delta T$ :


- Temperature rise taking into account conduction effects of aluminium
- Temperature rise combining effects of conduction from in-pile material and convection from natural movement of deuterium



# Modelling the In-Pile



Temperature rise of in-pile (conduction effects only) – HOT DAMAGE NOT a credible occurrence



- Modelling of helium injection at cryogenic temperature (100 K) unacceptably high stresses
- This reinforces our reasoning and further justifies preventing injection.

We can relax the helium injection logic for hot damage






# Development of a Solution

- Before injection should proceed automatically the following will need to be satisfied:
  - Deuterium needs to be in vapour state
  - Refrigeration Helium flow is ceased (very low alarm)
  - NEW: The refrigeration helium flow was greater than 273K **before** the CNS tripped / turned off.
- We need some way to retain what the temperature was! → a new variable??
- Still desired a MANUAL TRIGGER for maintenance purposes.
- Should still be allowed to proceed if there is helium refrigeration flow and it is adequately warm (STANDBY MODE)

# Revised Helium Injection LOGIC



New condition: "LAST RELIABLE IN-PILE TEMPERATURE" (LRIT)

Manual Trigger can be used during: maintenance (eg vacuum pumps)

Manual Inhibit option kept for "operational familiarity" but no envisaged to be used in day-to-day operation

RESET cancels injection sequence if no activating trigger remains, closes injection valve

90 second delay


# Since Implementation...

## Commissioned and tested AUGUST 2017 Shutdown

ANSTO *Testing after EDR-004 has been implemented*

Australian Nuclear Science & Technology Organisation  
PROJECT E0304 - HELIUM INJECTION LOGIC MODIFICATION

5 METHOD

Action	Observations / Measurements	Done
1. Visual Check - While the CNS is in HALT ensure the following is TRUE: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Last Reliable In-Pile Temperature (LRIT) is ON <i>Reliable to 20s</i></li> <li>Very low flow rate (VLFR) alarm is ON <i>Reliable to 20s</i></li> <li>D2 vapour is ON</li> <li>Ensure Manual Override is ON</li> <li>Ensure the Manual Trigger is OFF</li> </ul>	Acceptance Criteria: "Helium Filling Starts in 1.5 min" does not start.	
2. Set Manual Trigger to ON, indicated by a white circle to the right of the trigger buttons.  CHECK: The Manual Override ON prevents injection when LRIT and VLFR TRUE	Acceptance Criteria: "Helium Filling Starts in 1.5 min" does not start.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
3. I&C Engineer to set Very Low Flow-Rate Indicator OFF and LRIT OFF CHECK: The Manual Override ON prevents injection when MAN TRIG TRUE	Acceptance Criteria: "Helium Filling Starts in 1.5 min" does not start.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
4. Set Manual Trigger to OFF.		
5. Set Manual Override to OFF.		

*Man trigger on, override OFF. Helium inj sequ. should have started, but doesn't without RESET button*

*don't work because I think it's already agreed*

File Name: OPAL-6253-INS-01-1-002  
Revision: 1  
OPAL-6253-INS-01-1  
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## Changes to HMI Alarm Text and Operator Response to Alarm Manual

**6290\_08: HE\_INJ\_90S**  
CNS HELIUM INJECTION IN 1.5 MIN

**Alarm Limit:** Last Reliable In-Pile Temperature > 273K AND Very Low RCS Helium Flow Rate alarm AND D2 is Vapour AND Manual Inhibition OFF -OR- Manual Trigger ON AND D2 is Vapour AND Manual Inhibition OFF

**RCMS Screen:** L\_CNS\_Others

**Signal Tag/s:** 6290\_08: HE\_INJ\_90S  
Starts "He Filling starts in 1.5 min" sequence, i.e. helium will be injected into the CNS vacuum containment after a delay of 1.5 minutes from whence the "He Filling starts in 1.5 min" sequence was activated.


**Automatic Action:** Note: It is possible for helium injection to be manually requested by Reactor Operator (if D2 is vapour).

Step	Action	RCMS Screen	Additional Information
1.	He injection into vacuum containment will occur in 1.5 mins	L_CNS_Others	Helium will be injected into the CNS vacuum containment after a delay of 1.5 minutes from whence the "He Filling starts in 1.5 min" sequence was activated.  The "He Filling starts in 1.5 min" can be cancelled setting MANUAL INHIBITION to ON.

Approved: OPAL Reactor Manager  
Custodian: Operations Manager  
Date Approved: 22/8/12  
Revision: 01  
Page 1 of 1

**6290\_08: HE\_INJ\_90S**  
Hard Copy Uncontrolled

## Administrative Override Removed, no manual override



## Formally close out project

Australian Government **Ansto**

OP 35  
Project Completion Check Sheet

Project Number: E0304  
Project Title: Helium Injection Logic Modification

Item	Acceptance Criteria	Not Required	Complete	Comments/Notes/References
Manufacture, installation and commissioning work	Work completed as per documentation (e.g. SPE, ITP, INS)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OPAL-6253-INS-001 18-07-2017, 19-07-2017, 21-07-2017, scanned in Project Folder OPAL-6253-SWMS-004 OPAL-6253-SPE-001 E0304-EDR-001 / 002 / 003 / 004 / 005 / 006 DEF 019_E0304 DEF 019_E0304 - Additional for Alarm Removal



# The Story so Far

Undesired Helium Injection when in-pile cryogenic



Helium injection risk deemed unacceptable



Administrative control / injection override ON



Investigate / model helium injection using CFD to ensure no additional unforeseen events



Re-work helium injection logic / develop solution to remove override



Commission / test newly modified logic



Now we are here

Formally close out project



The Ansto logo features a stylized white 'A' with a dot and a horizontal line, followed by the word 'nsto' in a bold, lowercase sans-serif font. The background of the entire image is a blue sky with white, curved, light-streak patterns.

**Ansto**

**Thank you.  
Questions ???**

